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Introduction. This article provides a meta-analysis of a new, cognitive, approach to 
(non)verbal lie detection. This cognitive lie detection approach consists of three 
techniques, (i) imposing cognitive load, (ii) encouraging interviewees to say more and 
(iii) asking unexpected questions. 
Method. A meta-analysis was carried out on studies using the cognitive approach, 14 of 
which directly compared the cognitive approach to a standard approach.  
Results. The cognitive lie detection approach produced superior accuracy results in truth 
detection (67%), lie detection (67%) and total detection (truth and lie detection combined, 
71%) compared to a traditional standard approach (truth detection: 57%; lie detection: 
47%; total detection: 56%).  
Conclusions. Practitioners may find it useful to use a cognitive lie detection approach in 
their daily practice.  
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A Cognitive Approach to Lie Detection: A Meta Analysis 
 This article provides a meta-analysis of a new, cognitive, approach to (non)verbal 
lie detection. The starting point of this approach is Zuckerman, DePaulo and Rosenthal’s 
(1981) early observation that lying can be more mentally taxing than telling the truth. The 
new aspect is that investigators can magnify the difference in cognitive load that liars and 
truth tellers experience through specific interventions. The interviewing techniques 
discussed in this article focus on lie detection through observing someone’s behaviour or 
listening to someone’s speech when no other relevant background information is 
available. Such veracity judgements are frequently made and result in low accuracy rates 
(54% on average according to Bond and DePaulo’s, 2006, meta-analysis). For verbal lie 
detection when background information is available, see the Strategic Use of Evidence 
technique (Granhag & Hartwig, 2008, 2015; Hartwig, Granhag, & Luke, 2014).  
Reviews of the cognitive lie detection approach have been published before (Vrij, 
2014, 2015; Vrij & Granhag, 2012; Vrij, Granhag, Mann, & Leal, 2011; Vrij, Granhag, & 
Porter, 2010; Vrij, Leal, Mann, Vernham, & Brankaert, 2015). The main difference 
between this article and the previous articles is that this article expands the literature by 
reporting a meta-analysis examining whether the cognitive lie detection approach 
facilitates lie detection. The focus of this article is entirely on the meta-analysis. 
Elsewhere we describe in detail ‘theories about lying and cognition’ (Vrij, 2014), why 
and when liars experience more cognitive load than truth tellers in interview settings 
(Vrij, 2015), and the empirical evidence that liars do often experience more cognitive 
loads than truth tellers in interview settings (Vrij, 2015).  
Cognitive Lie Detection: 
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Enhancing the Differences in Cognitive Cues between Truth Tellers and Liars 
 The core of the cognitive lie detection approach is that investigators can magnify 
the differences in (non)verbal cues indicative of cognitive load displayed by truth tellers 
and liars through interventions based on cognitive principles that makes the liars’ task 
even more cognitively demanding. If successful, those interventions should result in liars 
displaying more diagnostic cognitive cues to deception and thereby facilitating lie 
detection. The cognitive lie detection approach consists of three techniques that can 
differentiate truth tellers from liars: (i) Imposing cognitive load, (ii) encouraging 
interviewees to provide more information, and (iii) asking unexpected questions.  
Imposing Cognitive Load 
 Imposing cognitive load is based on the well established empirical finding that in 
interview settings lying is typically more mentally taxing than truth telling (see for 
example fMRI research, Christ et al. 2009; Vrij & Ganis, 2014). Imposing cognitive load 
refers to investigators’ interventions aimed at making the interview setting mentally more 
difficult. Liars, who often require more cognitive resources than truth tellers in interviews 
settings, will have fewer cognitive resources left over. If cognitive demand is further 
raised, which could be achieved by making additional requests, liars may be less able 
than truth tellers to cope with these additional requests.  
 Ways to impose cognitive load is by asking interviewees to tell their stories in 
reverse order (e.g., Evans, Meissner, Michael, & Brandon, 2013; Vrij, Leal, Mann, & 
Fisher, 2012; Vrij et al., 2008; Zimmerman et al., 2010); by instructing interviewees to 
maintain eye contact with the interviewer (Vrij, Mann, Leal, & Fisher, 2010); by asking 
interviewees to carry out two tasks simultaneously (e.g., story telling while gripping an 
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object, Debey, Verschuere, & Crombez, 2012; Visu-Petra, Varga, Miclea, & Visu-Petra, 
2013); or through forced turn-taking which can be employed when two or more 
interviewees are interviewed together at the same time (Vernham, Vrij, Mann, Leal, & 
Hillman, 2014). In forced turn-taking, after asking the question, the investigator 
determines who starts answering a question. The investigator then interrupts that person 
after a short period of time and asks a second interviewee to continue with the story. 
After a short period of time, that person is interrupted and the third person (or the first 
person again in case of interviewing a pair) is asked to continue, etc.  
Encouraging Interviewees to Provide More Information 
  The second technique that may differentiate truth tellers from liars is encouraging 
interviewees to provide more information. If truth tellers provide more information they 
are more likely to be believed, because the richer an account is perceived to be in detail, 
the more likely it is to be believed (Bell & Loftus, 1989; Johnson, 2006; Johnson, Foley, 
Suengas, & Raye, 1988). Moreover, the additional information truth tellers provide could 
provide leads to investigators to check. Liars may find it cognitively too difficult to add 
as many details as truth tellers do, or, if liars do add a sufficient amount of detail, the 
additional information may be of lesser quality or may sound less plausible. Also, liars 
may be reluctant to add more information out of fear that it will provide leads to 
investigators and, consequently, give their lies away. In other words, techniques that 
facilitate interviewees to say more may result in truth tellers in particular saying more. 
Research has supported this premise. Experimental research to date has revealed four 
ways to facilitate truth tellers to say more: by using a supportive interviewer (nodding 
head and smiling during an interview, Mann et al., 2013; Shaw, Vrij, Mann, Leal, & 
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Hillman, 2013), by giving an example of a model answer (a very detailed answer, 
Bogaard, Meijer, & Vrij, 2014; Leal, Vrij, Warmelink, & Fisher, 2015), by using 
drawings (e.g., Vrij, Leal, et al., 2010; Vrij, Mann, Leal, & Fisher, 2012), and by using 
the Cognitive Interview technique (Ansarra et al., 2011; Bembibre & Higueras, 2011, 
2012; Colwell, Hiscock, & Memon, 2002; Colwell, Hiscock-Anisman, Memon, Rachel, & 
Colwell, 2007; Colwell, Hiscock-Anisman, Memon, Taylor, & Prewett, 2007; Colwell, 
Hiscock-Anisman, Memon, Colwell, Taylor, & Woods, 2009; Geiselman, 2012; 
Hernandez-Fernaud & Alonso-Quecuty, 1997; Köhnken, Schimossek, Aschermann, & 
Höfer, 1995; Memon,  Fraser, Colwell, Odinot, & Mastroberardino, 2010; Morgan, 
Colwell, Hazlett, 2011; Parker & Brown, 2000; Suckle-Nelson et al., 2010). 
 Asking Unexpected Questions 
 A consistent finding in the deception literature is that liars prepare themselves for 
anticipated interviews. They do so by preparing possible answers to questions they expect 
to be asked (Granhag, Andersson, Strömwall, & Hartwig, 2004; Granhag, Strömwall, & 
Jonsson, 2003; Hartwig, Granhag, & Strömwall, 2007; Vrij et al., 2009).  
This strategy of preparing answers for possible questions makes sense. Planning 
makes lying easier -thereby combating, to some degree, the additional cognitive demand of 
lying- and planned lies typically contain fewer cues to deceit than spontaneous lies (DePaulo 
et al., 2003). However, preparing for answers has a limitation. It will be fruitful only if liars 
correctly anticipate which questions will be asked. Investigators can exploit this 
limitation by asking questions that liars do not anticipate. Though liars can refuse to 
answer unexpected questions by saying “I don’t know” or “I can’t remember”, such 
responses will create suspicion if these questions are about central aspects of the target 
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event. A liar, therefore, has little option other than to fabricate a plausible answer on the 
spot, which is cognitively demanding. For liars, expected questions should be easier to 
answer than unexpected questions, because liars can give their planned and rehearsed 
answers to the expected questions but they need to fabricate answers to the unexpected 
questions. The difference liars experience in cognitive load while answering these two sets 
of questions should become evident in their verbal responses. In contrast, truth tellers 
experience similar levels of cognitive load while answering expected and unexpected 
questions, and they should produce more comparable answers to the expected and 
unexpected questions than liars.  
To date, in the unexpected-questions technique, comparisons between truth tellers 
and liars have been made in three different manners, each of which examines a different 
outcome measure (e.g., dependent variable). In a first set of studies, small groups of truth 
tellers who went on a mission together and small groups of liars who had fabricated a story 
about going on a mission together were interviewed separately. In the interview they were 
asked a mixture of expected and unexpected questions (for example general opening 
questions versus spatial questions, Vrij et al., 2009), and the answers given by the different 
individuals belonging to a group were compared to one another (Roos af Hjelmsäter, 
Ohman, Granhag, & Vrij, 2014; Sooniste, Granhag, Strömwall, & Vrij, in press; Vrij et 
al., 2009).  
In a second set of studies individual truth tellers and liars took part and were asked a 
mixture of expected and unexpected questions, for example about the execution (expected) 
or planning (unexpected) of intentions (Granhag & Knieps, 2011). Differences between 
truth tellers and liars in answering the two types of question were examined (Granhag & 
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Knieps, 2011; Knieps, Granhag, & Vrij, 2013a, b; Lancaster, Vrij, Hope, & Waller, 2012; 
Liu et al., 2010; Mac Giolla & Granhag, 2014; Shaw, Vrij, Mann, Leal, & Hillman, 2013; 
Sooniste, Granhag, Knieps, & Vrij, 2013; Vrij, Leal, Mann, & Granhag, 2011; 
Warmelink, Vrij, Mann, Jundi, & Granhag, 2012).  
In a third set of studies individual truth tellers and liars were interviewed and were 
asked the same unexpected question twice, albeit in a different format (verbal recall vs 
sketching). The overlap in the two answers was examined (Leins, Fisher, Vrij, 2012; 
Leins, Fisher, Vrij, & Mann, 2011).  
A Quantitative Review of the Cognitive Lie Detection Approach 
 Having introduced the cognitive lie detection approach above, the natural 
question to ask is: How effective is this approach compared to a standard lie detection 
approach? In this section, we present a meta-analysis of studies that compared the two 
approaches. We meta-analytically integrate accuracy rates and effect sizes and test the 
hypothesis that the cognitive load lie detection approach facilitates truth and lie detection. 
Moreover, data from additional studies that did not directly compare a standard with a 
cognitive lie detection approach but used the cognitive lie detection approach only will be 
used to precise the accuracy estimates from the direct comparison studies.  
Method 
Overview. We calculated effect sizes reflecting the difference in accuracy rates 
obtained with the standard and cognitive lie detection approaches and then integrated 
these effect sizes following standard meta-analytic methodology (Cooper & Hedges, 
1994; Hedges & Olkin, 1985). We did this separately for truth detection accuracy, lie 
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detection accuracy and total accuracy (i.e., truth and lie detection combined), and using 
two different measures of effect size, odds ratios and Cohen’s ds.1 Initial analyses 
covered estimates and statistical significance of the population effect sizes, assessments 
of effect size heterogeneity and fail-safe N analyses (as a rough indicator of potential 
publication bias). For both the odds ratio-based and the d-based meta-analyses, we used a 
random effects approach as recommended in the meta-analytic literature (e.g. Borenstein, 
Hedges & Rothstein, 2007). This approach assumes that there is not necessarily one 
fixed, ‘true’ effect size in the population but that the population effect size may vary as a 
function of differences in study design, participants, materials or procedures (which are 
treated as random variations). Subsequent moderator analyses explored if the 
effectiveness of the cognitive lie detection approach depends (1) on whether veracity 
classifications are based on participants’ judgments or on objective criteria and (2) on the 
type of cognitive lie detection manipulation (imposing load, encouraging interviewees to 
say more, asking unexpected questions). Participants’ judgements may give us an idea 
how accurate observers are in truth – lie classifications when being exposed to interviews 
where the cognitive approach was implemented but such judgements create noise, for 
example when observers focus on non-diagnostic cues or interpret the diagnostic cues 
incorrectly. Objective criteria classifications give us a better idea of the potential of the 
cognitive lie detection approach.  
 Included studies. We searched for relevant studies in Psyclit, Psycinfo, Google 
Scholar and Web of Knowledge by using combinations of key words such as ‘deception’, 
‘lie’, ‘lying’, ‘detection’, ‘cognitive load’, and ‘interviewing’. We also contacted the 
leading scholars (Colwell, Granhag, and Meissner) who are heads of their research 
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groups and active in this research area, and checked the websites of journals that have 
published work in this area (Applied Cognitive Psychology, Journal of Applied Research 
in Memory and Cognition, Law and Human Behavior, Legal and Criminological 
Psychology, Psychology, Crime, & Law). Inclusion criteria were (1) that a study had to 
employ some form of cognitive lie detection manipulation (imposing cognitive load, 
encouraging interviewees to report more, or asking unexpected questions) and (2) that it 
reported some measure(s) of accuracy of lie detection (accuracy percentages for truth 
detection, lie detection, or combined truth/lie detection accuracy). This resulted in 26 
experimental studies (reported in 24 papers, marked with asterisks in the reference list; 
two papers contained two experiments each), the details of which are summarized in 
Appendix 1. Fourteen of these studies explicitly contrasted lie detection in a cognitive lie 
detection approach condition with a standard approach condition (e.g., a condition that 
involved no cognitive lie detection manipulation as defined above), and were therefore 
included in our meta-analysis.  
Effect sizes and study weights. Each of the 14 direct comparison studies 
contributed one or three effect sizes (depending on whether they reported truth, lie and 
total detection accuracy or only the latter) to both the odds ratio-based and the d-based 
meta-analysis. In the odds ratio-based meta-analysis (see Haddock et al., 1998, for an 
introduction), the odds ratios were derived directly from the accuracy rates in two 
conditions. To illustrate, Colwell et al. (2002) report 62% and 76% total accuracy in the 
standard and cognitive lie detection approach conditions, respectively, which translates 
into an odds ratio of 1.94 [76%/(100%-76%) divided by 62%/(100%-62%)] in favour of 
the cognitive approach – in other words, the odds of accurate detection were almost twice 
                                                             A Cognitive Lie Detection Approach 
 
11 
as high with the cognitive approach. An odds ratio of 1.0 indicates no difference between 
conditions, and odds ratios of 3.0 or larger signals a strong effect. For the d-based meta-
analysis, Cohen’s d reflected the mean difference between the accuracy rates obtained 
with the cognitive vs. the standard approach, divided by the common standard deviation 
of these rates (a statistical compromise between the standard deviations within each 
approach). Although some studies used a within-participants manipulation of lie 
detection approach, we always computed Cohen’s d as if it had been found in a between-
participants design, following the generally accepted recommendation of Dunlap, 
Cortina, Vaslow, and Burke (1996).  
In both the odds ratio-based and the d-based meta-analyses, the effect sizes were 
obtained for each study and then meta-analytically integrated by weighting them 
according to sample size, whereby effect sizes from larger studies receive larger weights, 
as they are more reliable (being based on more observations). This is standard practice, 
but in the particular context of lie detection studies the issue of what should be regarded 
as the sample size is more complex than usual and therefore requires comment. 
Specifically, in some studies participant-observers watch or listen to statements by liars 
and/or truth tellers and then make decisions about the veracity of these statements. In 
other studies, veracity classifications are not made by observers but are based on 
objective criteria (e.g., the amount of detail in a statement) and a cut-off criterion or 
decision rule. Hence, the relevant sample sizes are the numbers of participant-observers 
(in different conditions) in the former studies and the numbers of categorized statements 
in the latter studies.   
Results 
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Lie detection accuracy. Table 1 summarizes the meta-analytic integration of the 
accuracy rates in the studies that directly compared the standard and cognitive approach, 
separately for total accuracy (14 studies) and for truth and lie detection accuracy (11 out 
of these 14 studies). The sample sizes and accuracy rates of the individual studies are 
documented in the Appendix (with one single exception for truth detection [Zimmerman 
et al., 2010], accuracy was always higher for the cognitive approach). Table 1 shows that 
the cognitive lie detection approach is superior to the standard approach for all three 
measures of detection accuracy (truth: 67% versus 57%, lie: 67% versus 47%, or 
combined: 71% versus 56% - note that the total accuracy rate differs from the average of 
the truth and lie accuracy rates because it is based on all 14 studies). It is noteworthy that 
the 56% (total) accuracy rate obtained with a standard approach very closely 
approximates the typical 54% accuracy rate typically found in deception research (Bond 
& DePaulo, 2006), z = 1.08, p = .28. By contrast, the 71% total accuracy rate obtained 
using the cognitive lie detection approach significantly exceeds this 54% accuracy 
benchmark, z = 9.37, p < .001.  
These differences in accuracy rates translate into small (truth accuracy) to 
moderate (lie and total accuracy) effect sizes in both the odds ratio-based and the d-based 
meta-analysis. Generally the findings obtained with the two meta-analytic approaches 
mostly coincide: The rank order of the effect sizes is the same (lie detection accuracy 
largest, truth smallest, total in between), and also all effect sizes differ significantly from 
zero (see Table 1 for the full pattern of results). The fail-safe Ns – the numbers of file-
drawer studies with zero effects sizes needed to render the effects non-significant 
(Rosenthal, 1979; Rosenberg, 2005) – were comparable as well, and they indicate that 
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publication bias is unlikely to be an issue here (certainly at the level of total accuracy). 
The most important difference between the two approaches is that the d-based meta-
analysis indicates more heterogeneity of effect sizes (particularly for total accuracy).  
Moderator analyses. Despite some non-significant heterogeneity of some of the 
effect sizes (see Table 1), we decided to proceed with our planned moderator analyses, as 
they are theoretically interesting and also sometimes moderator effects emerge in spite of 
statistical homogeneity of effect sizes. Our two moderator analyses checked whether the 
accuracy results reported in Table 1 (i) depended on how the accuracy judgements were 
made (by human judges or based on objective criteria, using e.g. a discriminant analysis 
algorithm) and (ii) if any of the cognitive lie detection techniques introduced earlier 
(imposing load, encouraging interviewees to say more, or asking unexpected questions) 
were more effective than others in terms of detection accuracy. The outcome of these 
moderator analyses (conducted on the basis of both odds ratios and Cohen’s ds) are 
summarised in Tables 2 and 3.  
How the veracity decisions were made (by humans or based on objective criteria) 
did not matter very much for total accuracy, QB(1) = 0.85, p = .36. This picture changed 
at the level of truth and lie accuracy (see Table 2). The weighted accuracy rates and the 
moderator effects (based on both odds ratios and Cohen’s ds2) show the same basic 
picture. For truth detection, the cognitive lie detection approach works best when veracity 
decisions are based on objective criteria, but there is little advantage over the standard 
approach for human observers. The opposite pattern emerged for lie detection, where the 
human observers profited more from the cognitive lie detection approach than criteria-
based lie detection. A possible explanation for these findings is that humans typically 
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obtain poor lie accuracy, due to having a truth bias (the inclination to think that a target 
person is telling the truth, Vrij, 2008). In that respect, there is for humans more room for 
improvement in increasing their lie accuracy than their truth accuracy.     
Our second moderator analysis explored if the effectiveness of the cognitive 
approach depended on the particular technique employed (imposing load, encouraging 
interviewees to say more, asking unexpected questions). As before, there was no 
significant moderator effect for total accuracy, QB(2) = 1.48, p = .48, but this was again 
owed to opposite moderator effects for truth and lie detection (see Table 3).3 For truth 
detection, the most effective technique was encouraging interviewees to say more, 
followed by asking unexpected questions and imposing load. An opposite pattern 
emerged for lie accuracy. The most effective lie detection technique was imposing load, 
followed by asking unexpected questions and encouraging interviewees to say more. This 
pattern nicely reflects the theoretical rationale given for the techniques. We argued that 
encouraging interviewees to say more would particularly encourage truth tellers to say 
more. Therefore, following this reasoning, truth tellers would differ most between 
standard and cognitive lie detection technique, which facilitates truth detection in 
particular. We also argued that liars in particular would face difficulties with coping with 
imposing cognitive load. Therefore, following this reasoning, liars would differ most 
between standard and cognitive lie detection conditions in this technique, which 
facilitates lie detection.  
A potential concern with these two moderator analyses is that there was 
considerable overlap between the moderators – all studies that imposed load involved 
human observers making the veracity decisions, and all studies that encouraged 
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interviewees to say more used criteria-based decisions (studies using unexpected 
questions were one each); this is why the patterns of effects are so similar. As a 
consequence, it is difficult to say which moderator is the substantial one that drives the 
differences in detection accuracy rates. Future meta-analyses, including more studies, 
may provide the answer.  
Cognitive lie detection approach findings based on all 26 studies. In addition 
to the studies reviewed above, which directly compared the cognitive lie detection 
approach to a standard approach, twelve further studies (see Appendix) had been 
conducted using the cognitive lie detection approach but without a standard approach 
comparison condition. These additional studies do not provide information about the 
effect of the cognitive approach (the topic of investigation in this article) but still gives 
some indication about the detection rates that can be expected from the cognitive lie 
detection approach. Combining these 12 additional studies with the 14 direct comparison 
studies discussed above amounted to 26 cognitive lie detection approach studies reporting 
total accuracy rates, 20 of which further reported truth and lie detection accuracy rates. 
The total accuracy weighted average based on 26 studies was 74% (95% CI = 71%, 
76%); the truth detection accuracy, based on 20 studies, was 69% (66%, 73%) and the lie 
detection accuracy, also based on 20 studies, was 70% (66%, 73%).  
Finally, we were interested in correlations between truth and lie accuracy as a 
function of the lie detection approach. Interestingly, the correlation between the truth and 
lie accuracy rates across the 11 standard approach studies was negative, r = -.29, but 
strongly positive across the 20 cognitive approach studies, r = .52. The difference 
between these two correlations was significant, z = 2.04, p = .04. The lack of a truth bias 
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and the correlational findings, taken together, suggest that the cognitive lie detection 
approach not only boosts detection rates overall but boosts truth and lie detection in such 
a way that the typical truth bias is eliminated.  
Summary of the meta-analytic findings on truth and lie detection accuracy. 
In sum, the meta-analytic findings confirmed the superiority of the cognitive lie detection 
approach. Specifically, the cognitive lie detection approach led to better total detection 
accuracy (71% versus 56%) and also into more accurate classifications of truth tellers 
(67% versus 57%) and liars (67% versus 47%), when compared directly to a standard 
approach. Additional studies using the cognitive lie detection approach only led to 
somewhat higher detection rates (74% overall, and 69% and 70% for truth and lie 
detection, respectively).  
Two moderator analyses indicated that (1) human observers mostly profited from 
the cognitive lie detection approach in terms of lie detection, whereas criterion-based 
detection benefited mostly in terms of truth detection, and (2) that different cognitive 
techniques had different strengths in terms of truth and lie detection. Encouraging 
interviewees to say more facilitates truth detection in particular and imposing cognitive 
load facilitates lie detection in particular. Finally, descriptive and correlational findings 
suggested that the cognitive approach may effectively overcome the typical truth bias in 
veracity judgements.  
Discussion 
 We finish this article with some concluding thoughts about the cognitive lie 
detection approach. We will briefly discuss the applicability of the approach by 
discussing interviewees’ willingness to answer questions (a requirement in each lie 
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detection tool that is based on the analyses of speech) and the settings in which the 
various techniques can be employed. We will also discuss the practical utility of the 
findings presented in this meta-analysis, provide an explanation as to why the increased 
accuracy rates occurred, and define unexpected questions.  
The Applicability of the Cognitive Lie Detection Approach   
 The cognitive lie detection approach is predominantly based on the analyses of 
verbal responses. Of course, verbal analyses can take place only if interviewees talk. To 
encourage interviewees to talk the cognitive lie detection approach utilises an 
information-gathering interview style which is, amongst other aspects, characterised by 
providing opportunities for uninterrupted recall (Meissner, 2011; Meissner et al., 2014). 
The stereotypical view, often addressed in police manuals (e.g., Inbau et al., 2013), is that 
suspects are reluctant to talk and that investigators need to use an accusatory approach to 
get them to talk, characterised by confrontation, and the use of minimisation and 
maximisation techniques (Kelly, Miller, Redlich, & Kleinman, 2013; Meissner, 2011; 
Meissner et al., 2014). The view that an accusatory approach is required is by no means 
shared by all practitioners. For example, Soufan (2011), an experienced and successful 
American FBI interrogator who gathered valuable information from al-Qaeda suspects, 
did not use an accusatory approach when interviewing them. Instead he used an 
information-gathering approach characterised by rapport building, truth seeking and 
listening. He also reported in his book the benefit of asking spatial questions for lie 
detection purposes. In addition, Tedeschini (2012), a Canadian police trainer, also 
advocates the information-gathering approach.  
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 Research has shown that the idea that suspects in police interviews are unwilling 
to talk in information-gathering interviews is a myth rather than fact. A systematic 
analysis of more than 1,067 such police interviews in the UK has shown that only 5% of 
the suspects remained silent (Moston, Stephenson, & Williamson, 1993). In addition, in 
his analysis of 600 information-gathering police interviews, Baldwin (1993) found that 
80% of the suspects were thoroughly cooperative and answered police questions of 
significance. Furthermore, a recent meta-analysis of field and laboratory studies about the 
influence of the interview/interrogation method on confession outcomes revealed that 
information-gathering approaches significantly increased the likelihood of true 
confessions and significantly decreased the likelihood of false confessions compared to 
accusatory approaches (Meissner, 2011; Meissner et al., 2014). In addition, accusatory 
approaches significantly increased both true and false confessions compared to control 
conditions. Moreover, information-gathering approaches elicited significantly more 
relevant information and significantly more diagnostic cues to deceit than accusatorial 
methods. In summary, research findings do not back up the idea that suspects are 
reluctant to talk and that accusatory techniques are needed to yield success in interviews. 
On the contrary, an information-gathering approach yields better results in obtaining 
relevant information, obtaining confessions and eliciting cues to deceit. 
 The lie detection techniques that we have discussed can be employed in various 
settings. The techniques can be employed to determine the veracity of statements about 
past activities and future activities (intentions). It has been shown that the unexpected- 
questions technique can be employed to identify deceit in both individuals and groups of 
liars. Future research should examine whether the techniques are sensitive to 
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countermeasures, that is, liars’ attempts to fool investigators. The unexpected-questions 
technique should be immune to this, as its method is to ask questions that a liar has not 
anticipated and therefore not prepared answers for. The number of unexpected questions 
that can be asked about core elements of the event is vast, which reduces the risk that the 
unexpected questions become anticipated after some time. However, investigators should 
be aware that after some time suspects will know which questions are asked, and should 
change the questions regularly to keep them unexpected. Due to individual differences in 
people’s responses, within-subjects lie detection techniques are preferable because they 
control for such individual differences. Some of the unexpected-questions techniques are 
within-subjects techniques.  
It is important to note that in the cognitive lie detection studies in which observers 
made veracity judgements, the observers were never coached about which cues to pay 
attention to. In other words, it appears that observers pick up these cues naturally and a 
training program about such cues does not seem to be necessary. Of course, this does not 
rule out that observers will perform even better if they receive guidance about what to 
look for. Indeed, Colwell et al. (2009) found that trained observers obtained a 
significantly higher total accuracy (77%) than untrained observers (57%).  
Practical Utility of the Findings 
 The findings showed that the cognitive lie detection approach produced superior 
total accuracy rates both with human observers and through an analysis of objective 
criteria. The finding that human observers also improved their ability to discriminate 
between truth tellers and liars is important as it demonstrates the potential applicability of 
the cognitive lie detection approach in real life as practitioners in the field will make 
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human-based rather than criteria-based decisions. However, in the lie detection studies 
included in this meta-analysis -as well as in lie detection studies in general- relative 
judgements rather than absolute judgements were made. In other words, the results of the 
meta-analysis indicate that by using the cognitive lie detection technique, 71% of truth 
tellers and liars were classified correctly but the findings do not tell us about the accuracy 
of these techniques in classifying correctly each given individual. However, we can 
conclude that using the cognitive lie detection approach increases the chance of 
classifying an individual correctly as being a truth teller or liar. The results also tell us 
that if practitioners use a cognitive lie detection technique, they will correctly classify 
more individuals than when they use a standard technique. Or to give an example in a 
different context, for a professional gambler it would certainly pay off if s/he knew the 
chances of winning a hand in the long run, despite not being able to be certain about the 
outcome in any individual game. 
 Of course, accuracy rates around the 70% are still quite modest which has 
implications for real life, for example for clinical use or for mass screening at border 
controls, where the error rate should be much lower for a lie detection technique to be 
useful. This point of criticism does not just apply to the cognitive lie detection technique, 
every veracity assessment tool developed to date encounters this problem (Vrij, 2008).  
An Explanation of the Increased Accuracy Rates 
 A plausible explanation as to why the cognitive lie detection approach resulted in 
superior accuracy rates than a standard approach is that the cognitive lie detection 
approach elicits more and/or stronger (non)verbal cues to deceit. An analysis of the 
number of cues elicited by a cognitive lie detection or standard technique was not the 
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topic of investigation in this meta-analysis. In fact, these ‘cues data’ are not entirely 
suitable for a meta-analytic approach. The problem is that different researchers examine 
different cues, and that, if they use the same cues, they operationalise them sometimes 
somewhat differently. This makes it difficult to compare the studies with each other. For 
this reason Vrij, Fisher, Blank, Leal, & Mann (in press), who reviewed the cues data, 
presented only a basic documentation and descriptive analyses on the elicited cues to 
deception. The results showed that cues to deceit were twice as likely to occur when a 
cognitive lie detection technique was employed compared to a standard technique.  
Characteristics of an Unexpected Question 
An important question is how to define an ‘unexpected question’. The 
experiments to date have shown that spatial questions are unexpected, and so are 
temporal questions and questions about planning. No doubt, many more types of 
unexpected questions will emerge in future research. Truth tellers and liars will find 
unexpected questions equally unexpected. The difference between truth tellers and liars 
emerges in how difficult such questions are for them to answer. Truth tellers should be 
able to rely on their memory of the event when answering these questions and, if their 
memory is clear and vivid, will not find the questions too difficult to answer. Liars, 
however, will not have ready-made answers prepared for these unexpected questions and 
will find them much more difficult to answer. Furthermore, if liars must create an ad-hoc 
answer to an unexpected question, they may also have difficulty remembering the answer 
for the purpose of providing the same answer (consistency) on a later interview.  
The key for the unexpected questions technique to work is that truth tellers will 
know the answer to both expected and unexpected questions. For that to happen, all 
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questions should be about central rather than peripheral parts of the event. In that respect, 
the unexpected-questions technique differs from Levine et al.’s ‘strategic questioning’ 
technique (Levine, Shaw, & Shulman, 2010). In their experiment, some participants 
cheated on a test and had to deny this in a subsequent interview (liars), whereas other 
participants did not cheat (truth tellers). ‘Strategic’ questions about the cheating (‘Did 
any cheating occur?’) were compared with ‘non-strategic’ questions that were unrelated 
to cheating (‘How much experience have you had with doing teamwork activities?’). 
Observers were better able to detect deceit in the strategic questioning condition. This is 
probably unsurprising as the non-strategic questions had nothing to do with cheating, and 
were therefore not about the central part of the event. The question asked in the strategic 
questioning condition ‘Did cheating occur?’ was most likely expected by the 
interviewees, and therefore perhaps not the best question to ask to distinguish between 
truth tellers and liars.  
Conclusion 
 All available theories and models about deception acknowledge that lying could 
be mentally more taxing than truth telling. The new aspect of the cognitive lie detection 
approach that we propose here is that investigators can magnify the differences in 
cognitive load experienced between liars and truth tellers, and thereby enhance their 
ability to detect deception. We hope that this article will stimulate research in this area 
and will motivate practitioners to employ a cognitive lie detection approach. 
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1 We opted for using two different effect sizes because one of the reviewers and 
the third author of this paper could not agree on their relative merits in the context of this 
meta-analysis. Odds ratios are the recommended type of effect size for categorical data 
(Fleiss, 1994; Haddock Rindskopf, & Shadish, et al., 1998), with which we are dealing 
here (i.e. statements being judged as true or false). Meta-analyses based on odds ratios 
are very common in the medical sciences, for instance (see Egger, Smith, & Phillips, 
1997; or the Cochrane Handbook, Higgins & Green, 2011). A weakness of odds ratios is 
that they do not take dependencies between judgements into account (if the same person 
makes multiple judgements, for example).  
Cohen’s d is a more popular and well-known effect size in psychology, but has its 
weaknesses as well. Specifically, measures of effect size for continuous data (such as 
Cohen’s d) are suboptimal for the analysis of accuracy data that are based on categorical 
veracity judgments (true vs. false; Dixon, 2008). Moreover, Cohen’s d is inflated if 
averages are computed across repeated trials within conditions (Brand, Bradley, Best & 
Stoica, 2011; Wiedermann, Gula, Czech & Muschik, 2011), as is the case in some lie 
detection studies where participants make multiple veracity judgments.  
Readers will have their own opinions regarding which approach they find more 
convincing. To pragmatically resolve the issue here, we use both approaches (as other 
authors have done, e.g. Bond & DePaulo, 2006, in their meta-analysis of lie detection 
accuracy) and present both sets of results. A positive potential effect of this dual 
approach is that we may have more confidence in the results if the findings obtained with 
both approaches agree.  
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2 The two approaches differ in one respect: The odds ratio-based analysis shows 
only a marginal moderator effect for lie detection, whereas this effect is highly significant 
in the d-based analysis. This difference is a consequence of the larger indicated 
heterogeneity of the lie detection effect sizes in the d-based analysis, which is turn a 
consequence of the fact that one study (Evans et al., 2013) is an extreme outlier in the d-
based analysis but only a mild outlier in the odds ratio-based approach (which is why we 
decided to retain it).   
3 Again, the weighted accuracy rates and the moderator analyses showed the same 
general pattern of results, except for the statistical significance of the moderator effect for 
lie detection accuracy (see Footnote 2 for an explanation).  
 




Meta-Analytic Results for Total, Truth and Lie Detection Accuracy Using the Standard 
(Sta) vs. Cognitive (Cog) Approach 
 Type of Detection (Number of Included Studies) 
Total (14) Truth (11) Lie (11) 
Detection Accuracy  
(% correct, [95% CI])1 
Sta: 56 [52, 60] 
Cog: 71 [68, 75] 
Sta: 57 [52, 63] 
Cog: 67 [62, 73] 
Sta: 47 [41, 53] 
Cog: 67 [62, 72] 
Odds ratio-based approach 
Effect size [95% CI] 1.97 [1.53, 2.52] 1.53 [1.09, 2.15] 2.38 [1.38, 4.11] 
Heterogeneity  Q(13) = 9.56 (ns) Q(10) = 9.23 (ns) Q(10) = 23.15 * 
z (Cog > Sta) 5.33 *** 2.47 ** 3.11 *** 
Fail-safe N2 134 14 29 
Cohen’s d-based approach 
Effect size [95% CI] 0.42 [0.26, 0.58] 0.24 [0.08, 0.40] 0.53 [0.17, 0.88] 
Heterogeneity  Q(13) = 25.33 * Q(10) = 8.37 (ns) Q(10) = 44.76 *** 
z (Cog > Sta) 5.04 *** 2.93 ** 2.92 * 
Fail-safe N2 118 24 24 
1 Sample size-weighted averages. 2 The number of studies with zero effect sizes needed to 
render the meta-analytic effect non-significant; calculated after Rosenberg (2005) on the 
basis of the weighted effect sizes, assuming heterogeneity of effect sizes.   
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 




Moderator Analyses of the Impact of Type of Decision-Making (by Human Observers or 
based on Objective Criteria) on the Effectiveness of Lie Detection Using the Standard (Sta) 
vs. Cognitive (Cog) Approach 
 Truth Detection Lie Detection 
Detection accuracy (% correct, [95% CI])1 
    Human Observers (N = 6) 
Sta: 57 [50, 63] 
Cog: 60 [53, 67] 
Sta: 37 [30, 44] 
Cog: 64 [57, 71] 
    Objective Criteria (N = 5) 
Sta: 58 [49, 68] 
Cog: 80 [73, 88] 
Sta: 66 [57, 75] 
Cog: 73 [65, 81] 
Odds ratio-based approach 
Moderator effect QB(1) = 5.35 * QB(1) = 3.25 
(*) 
    Human Observers (N = 6) 1.18 [0.79, 1.77] 2 3.49 [1.45, 8.37] 
    Objective Criteria (N = 5) 2.82 [1.52, 5.23] 1.46 [0.81, 2.64] 
Cohen’s d-based approach 
Moderator effect QB(1) = 4.13 * QB(1) = 11.02 *** 
    Human Observers (N = 6) 0.12 [-0.08, 0.32] 0.83 [0.28, 1.38] 
    Objective Criteria (N = 5) 0.47 [0.20, 0.74] 0.16 [-0.11, 0.43] 
(*) p < .10, * p < .05, *** p < .001. QB
 = heterogeneity between factor levels. 1 Sample size-
weighted averages. 2 Effect size [95% confidence interval]. 
 




Moderator Analyses of the Impact of Detection Technique (Imposing Load, Encouraging 
Interviewees to Say More, Asking Unexpected Questions) on the Effectiveness of Lie 
Detection Using the Standard (Sta) vs. Cognitive (Cog) Approach 
 Truth Detection Lie Detection 
Detection accuracy (% correct, [95% CI])1 
    Imposing Load (N = 5) 
Sta: 56 [48, 64] 
Cog: 58 [51, 66] 
Sta: 34 [26, 41] 
Cog: 63 [56, 71] 
    Encouraging Interviewees (N = 4) 
Sta: 57 [46, 68] 
Cog: 81 [72, 89] 
Sta: 69 [59, 79] 
Cog: 74 [66, 83] 
    Unexpected Questions (N = 2) 
Sta: 61 [48, 74] 
Cog: 74 [62, 86] 
Sta: 53 [39, 66] 
Cog: 67 [54, 80] 
Odds ratio-based approach 
Moderator effect QB(2) = 6.05 * QB(2) = 4.15 (ns) 
    Imposing Load (N = 5) 1.10 [0.71, 1.71] 2 4.04 [1.38, 11.81] 
    Encouraging Interviewees (N = 4) 3.00 [1.51, 5.95] 1.40 [0.72, 2.74] 
    Unexpected questions (N = 2) 1.85 [0.81, 4.24] 1.79 [0.82, 3.93] 
Cohen’s d-based approach 
Moderator effect QB(2) = 4.65 (ns) QB(2) = 14.79 *** 
    Imposing Load (N = 5) 0.09 [-0.13, 0.31] 0.94 [0.29, 1.59] 
    Encouraging Interviewees (N = 4) 0.50 [0.19, 0.80] 0.14 [-0.16, 0.43] 
    Unexpected questions (N = 2) 0.29 [-0.09, 0.67] 0.29 [-0.09, 0.67] 
* p < .05, *** p < .001. QB
 = heterogeneity between factor levels. 1 Sample size-weighted 
averages. 2 Effect size [95% confidence interval].
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(1) Evans et al. (2013), Study 1 46 46 Obs 55 18 37 59 75 67 
(2) Vrij et al. (2008) 24 31 Obs 50 42 46 56 60 58 
(3) Vrij, Mann et al. (2010) 52 54 Obs 55 49 52 56 51 54 
(4) Vrij et al. (2012) 62 62 Cri -- -- 71 -- -- 87 
(5) Vernham et al. (2014) 30 30 Obs 53 40 47 73 80 77 





(7) Ansarra et al. (2011)   Cri    67 63 65 
(8) Colwell et al. (2002) 50 75 Cri 67 58 62 84 68 76 
(9) Colwell et al. (2007a), Exp. 1  58 Cri      69 
(10) Colwell et al. (2007a), Exp. 2  131 Cri      75 
(11)  Colwell et al. (2009)  30 Obs      67 
(12) Colwell et al. (2007b)  38 Cri    68 89 79 
(13) Köhnken et al. (1995) 30 29 Cri   60   86 
(14) Leal et al. (2015), Exp 2 43 40 Cri 52 73 63 85 75 80 
(15) Mann et al. (2013) 42 42 Cri 53 65 59 71 75 73 
(16) Morgan et al. (2011)  34 Cri    81 85 83 
(17) Parker & Brown (2000)  28 Cri    88 92 89 
(18) Suckle-Nelson et al. (2010)  83 Cri    75 86 80 
(19) Vrij, Leal et al. (2010) 31 31 Cri 53 88 71 80 88 84 
 Standard Asking 





(20) Lancaster et al. (2013)  80 Cri    78 83 80 
(21) Leins et al. (2011), Exp. 1  80 Cri    80 70 75 
(22) Leins et al. (2011), Exp. 2  34 Cri    100 77 89 
(23) Liu et al. (2010) 46 46 Obs   57   59 
(24) Vrij et al. (2009) 40 40 Cri 64 53 58 79 65 72 
(25) Vrij et al. (2011) 35 32 Obs 59 53 56 71 68 69 
(26) Warmelink et al. (2012)  86 Cri    69 75 72 
 
Note. This appendix includes studies comparing the standard and cognitive lie detection approaches 
as well as studies that use the cognitive lie detection approach only (these studies do not have entries 
in the ‘Standard’ columns). Also, where particular experimental conditions within studies have been 
combined (see notes to individual studies below), the means and effects sizes have been re-
calculated, using the raw data where possible. The sample sizes are total sample sizes (i.e. aggregated 
across truth and lie detection conditions; further breakdowns are available from the authors upon 
request). Obs = Human observers, Cri = Criteria-based veracity classification. 
 
Individual studies: (1) Evans, Michael, Meissner, & Brandon (2013). In Study 1, students watched 
four video clips (of 2 liars and 2 truth tellers). Study 2 was not included because cognitive load was 
not manipulated but inferred from language proficiency. (2) Vrij, Mann, Fisher, Leal, Milne, & Bull 
(2008). Observers (in Exp. 2; British police officers) watched 12 video clips (6 liars and 6 truth tellers 
from Exp. 1). (3) Vrij, Mann, Leal, & Fisher (2010). Observers (in Exp. 2) watched/listened to 
video/audiotapes (showing 8 liars and 8 truth tellers each from Exp. 1). The ‘video and audio’ and 
‘audio’ conditions are combined. (4) Vrij, Leal, Mann, & Fisher (2012). Pairwise veracity 
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classifications based on the amount of detail elicited for 2 statements (1 true, 1 false) by the same 
interviewee, using either chronological order (= standard) or reverse order (= cognitive) questions. 
(5) Vernham, Vrij, Mann, Leal, & Hillman (2014). Observers in Exp. 2 read one transcript each 
(from 1 liar or 1 truth teller in Exp. 1); comparison between non-turn taking condition (condition 1) 
and turn-taking condition examining the turn-taking cues (condition 3). (6) Zimmerman, Veinott, 
Meissner, Fallon, & Mueller (2010). Interviewers made veracity judgements based on standard 
approach and cognitive approach interviews. (7) Ansarra, Colwell, Hiscock-Anisman, Hines, Fleck, 
Cole, & Belarde (2011). Reality Interview. (8) Colwell, Hiscock, & Memon (2002). Criteria-based 
veracity classification, cognitive and inferential interviews combined (using the results reported in 
their Table 4; classified cases only).  (9) Colwell, Hiscock-Anisman, Memon, Rachel, & Colwell 
(2007) Experiment 1. Cognitive Interview. (10) Colwell, Hiscock-Anisman, Memon, Rachel, & Colwell 
(2007), Experiment 2. Cognitive Interview. (11) Colwell, Hiscock-Anisman, Memon, Colwell, Taylor, 
& Woods (2009). Cognitive interview, observers read transcripts, untrained and trained judges 
combined. (12) Colwell, Hiscock-Anisman, Memon, Taylor, & Prewett (2007). Reality Interview, initial 
recall and follow up questions combined. (13) Köhnken, Schimossek, Aschermann, & Höfer, (1995). 
Standard interview versus cognitive interview, CBCA-based classification results only (see Table 5 in 
Köhnken et al., 1995). (14) Leal, Vrij, Warmelink, Vernham & Fisher (2015). Standard interview 
versus model response interview (Exp. 2). (15) Mann, Vrij, Shaw, Leal, Ewens, Hillman, Granhag, & 
Fisher (2013). Neutral interviewer (= standard approach) vs. supportive interviewer (= cognitive lie 
detection approach) conditions; suspicious interviewer condition excluded. Objective and subjective 
detail scores combined for veracity classification. (16) Morgan, Colwell, & Hazlett (2011). First and 
second account combined. (17) Parker & Brown (2000). CBCA results only, unsubstantiated cases 
(i.e. neither clearly true nor false) excluded. (18) Suckle- Nelson, Colwell, Hiscock-Anisman, 
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Florence, Youschak, & Duarte (2010). Initial recall and follow up questions combined. (19) Vrij, 
Leal, Mann, Warmelink, Granhag, & Fisher (2010). Veracity classification based on whether agent 
was included in text (= standard approach) or drawing (= cognitive lie detection approach). (20) 
Lancaster, Vrij, Hope, & Waller (2013). (21) Leins, Fisher, Vrij, Leal, & Mann (2011), Experiment 
1. (22) Leins, Fisher, Vrij, Leal, & Mann (2011), Experiment 2. (23) Liu, Granhag, Landström, Roos 
af Hjelmsäter, Strömwall, & Vrij (2010). Students in Exp. 2 watched video clips of children’s (true or 
false) statement from Exp. 1. The children had been asked anticipated (= standard) versus 
unanticipated (= cognitive lie detection) questions. (24) Vrij, Leal, Granhag, Mann, Fisher, Hillman, & 
Sperry (2009). Results collapsed across delay variable. General questions score (= standard approach) 
versus spatial, temporal and drawing scores combined (= cognitive lie detection approach). (25) Vrij, 
Leal, Mann, & Granhag (2011). Students in Exp. 2 read transcribed statements (1 truthful, 1 
deceptive) from military/police officers in Exp. 1. Past activities (Condition 1 in Exp. 2 = standard 
approach) versus intentions (Condition 2 = cognitive lie detection approach) comparison. Condition 3 
(past activities and intentions) was excluded. (26) Warmelink, Vrij, Mann, Jundi, & Granhag (2012).  
 
 
